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Examining Pharmaceutical Exceptionalism: Intellectual
Property, Practical Expediency, and Global Health
Govind Persad*
ABSTRACT

Advocates, activists, and academics have criticized pharmaceutical
intellectual property ("pharma IP") rights as obstacles to access to medicines for
the global poor. These criticisms of pharma IP holders are frequently
exceptionalist: they focus on pharma IP holders while ignoring whether others also
bear obligations to assist patients in need. These others include holders of other
lucrative IP rights, such as music copyrights or technology patents; firms, such as
energy companies and banks, that do not rely on IP; and wealthy private
individuals. Their resources could be used to aid patients by providing direct
medical assistance, funding prizes or biomedical research, or purchasing
pharmaceutical patents and granting rights to the disadvantaged.
After identifying this exceptionalism, this Article evaluates several arguments
in its defense. These are that pharma IP holders are unique in (1) owning what poor
patients need, (2) being in special proximity to these patients, (3) being able to
assist at low cost to themselves, (4) having a professional duty to help these
patients, or (5) being implicated by their past conduct in these patients' plight. It
concludes that none of these arguments are compelling: while IP holders have a
duty to help, this duty is not fundamentally different from the duties others owe.
Even though this project criticizes exceptionalism, it does not absolve pharma
IP holders of duties to help the sick. Rather, it argues that spreading the costs of
aiding patients in need across a greater number of market actors, via publicly
funded "pull" programs like prizes and patent buyouts or "push" programs like
grants, would be preferable. So would allowing pharmaceutical firms to seek
contribution from others who are able to help. However, if others cannot be held
to account, imposing burdens on pharma IP holders can be justified in order to
promote global health: treating wealthy firms arbitrarily is preferable to ignoring
the urgent needs of the global poor.
*Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. JD, PhD, Stanford University. An
early draft of this article was selected for the 2018 American Society for Law, Medicine, and Ethics
BiolP Scholars Workshop at Georgia State University; I am grateful to my workshop commentators
Erin Fuse Brown, Cynthia Ho and Kevin Outterson, as well as to Sam Halabi, Patti Zettler, Yaniv
Heled, Deepa Varadarajan, Nicholson Price, Joe Miller, Sarah Conly, Scott Sehon, Matthew Stuart,
Aaron Kesselheim, Ameet Sarpatwari, Leslie Wolf, Shubha Ghosh, Rebecca Wolitz, an audience at
Bowdoin College, and the staff of the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics for their
suggestions and Kira Case for research assistance.
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EXAMINING PHARMACEUTICAL ExCEPTIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

This Article examines and criticizes what it dubs pharmaceutical
exceptionalism in debates over intellectual property ("IP") and health.
Pharmaceutical exceptionalists regard IP rights in medicines as a major
impediment to global health, and therefore argue for eliminating IP protections or
imposing greater obligations on IP holders. It agrees with exceptionalists that IP
protections can impede global health goals. But it contends that exceptionalists err
by focusing narrowly on IP holders and ignoring other actors whose resources
could be harnessed to improve access to medicines and to improve global health
more generally.
To see how a variety of actors might owe obligations to people in medical
need, consider the following vignette.' Phumeza Tisile is a South African patient
who contracted extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB). Her diagnosis
was delayed because the diagnostic device for XDR-TB was not available in South
Africa. Linezolid, the recommended treatment for XDR-TB, cost US $67 per pill
in the South African private sector market. A patent was preventing market entry
of a generic that would have cost under $8 per pill. Because Phumeza could not
afford linezolid, she took other medications that had serious side effects.2
Who should have helped Phumeza? The United Nations Secretary-General's
High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines focuses its analysis and criticism on
holders of IP rights, such as the firm holding the patent rights to linezolid. But
other firms and individuals could have helped as well. Some-like retailers selling
linezolid and wholesalers generating the raw materials for it-could have helped
by reducing their contribution to the final price. Other pharmaceutical companies
could have helped by developing competing treatments that drive down the price
of the patented intervention.' Furthermore, Phumeza's difficulty in affording
linezolid reflects not merely its price but also her limited financial resources.
Actors outside the medical sector, including individuals, corporations, civil society
organizations, and national governments, could have helped her by lowering prices
for other goods, increasing her wages, providing her with affordable insurance, or
simply transferring money to her. Other actors could also have helped Phumeza by
ameliorating the underlying social conditions that contributed to her contracting
XDR-TB.
1.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2016),

http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report, at 15 [hereinafter REPORT ON ACCESS].
2. Id.
3. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Promoting Competition to Address
Pharmaceutical Prices,

Health

Affairs

Policy

Options

Paper,

March

15,

2018,

https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20180116.967310/full/ (observing that competition
among branded drugs can sometimes lower drug prices, using the case of Hepatitis C drugs as an
example).
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In Part I, this Article reviews a variety of exceptionalist assertions that IP
holders are acting wrongly by failing to promote global health, as well as proposals
to impose legal duties on IP holders or encourage private actors to hold them to
account. In Part II, the Article evaluates five potential bases for the core
exceptionalist claim that IP holders have a special duty to assist patients like
Phumeza over and above the duties other firms or individuals might have. These
are that pharma IP holders are unique in (1) owning what poor patients need, (2)
being in special proximity to these patients, (3) being able to assist at low cost to
themselves, (4) having a professional duty to help these patients, or (5) being
implicated by their past conduct in these patients' plight. It concludes that none of
these arguments are compelling: while IP holders have a duty to help, it is dubious
that their duty is stronger than the duties owed by others.
In Parts III.A and III.B, the Article considers two strategies for moving beyond
pharmaceutical exceptionalism. The first would promote access to medicines
through public funding financed by broad-based taxes and giving. The second,
modeled on the doctrine of contribution in tort law, would empower
pharmaceutical IP holders to seek compensation from other actors who are also in
a position to promote global health. In Part III.C, it argues that pharmaceutical
exceptionalist laws can be a legitimate strategy for promoting global health even
when they do not align with firms' moral obligations, but that pharmaceutical
exceptionalism is a strategy rather than a goal in itself.
Because debates around pharmaceutical IP and global health have been so
charged, situating this Article in the existing debate is crucial. This Article
challenges the frequently advanced claim that holders of IP rights owe uniquely
strong moral duties to patients like Phumeza in need of patented medicines. 4 It
argues that the lens of global health advocacy should be broadened beyond
concerns about pharmaceutical IP. But-unlike scholarship that seeks to exempt
pharmaceutical IP holders from global health responsibilities-the Article does not
conclude that imposing uniquely strong legal duties on holders of IP rights would
be wrong. Instead, it concludes that while the morally ideal solution would be a
division of burdens among all who can help, it is acceptable to assign stricter legal
duties to pharmaceutical IP holders than to others who have moral duties to assist.
When others cannot be held to account, imposing burdens on pharmaceutical IP
holders can be justified in order to promote global health: as Part III.C argues,
4. E.g. William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare:Developing Drugs
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 581, 647 (2007) (discussing pharmaceutical patents
through a lens of ethical obligation); Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's
IntellectualProperty Fightfor Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 257, 282-83 (2002)
("Gradually, a viable international consensus on the importance of access to medication and
affordable prices has developed and this access has been linked to health as a human right. Within
this framework, actions taken by the pharmaceutical industry to protect their patents seem
increasingly immoral.").
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underinclusiveness and arbitrariness are preferable to ignoring the urgent needs of
the disadvantaged.
I. IP-FOCUSED SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL HEALTH NEEDS

Commentators have criticized pharmaceutical IP holders for aggressive
enforcement of intellectual property rights under current treaties; for seeking
expanded intellectual property protections as part of new international trade
agreements; and for resisting the use of procedures such as compulsory licensing.
Some of the most broadly criticized IP rights are those found in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (generally referred to as the
"TRIPS" agreement), which has been excoriated for undermining access to
lifesaving medicines for patients in developing countries. 5 More recent
international agreements and proposed agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, have been similarly criticized. 6 So have bilateral treaties such as the
recent Korea-United States free trade agreement.7 This Part reviews arguments that
pharmaceutical IP holders are failing in their global health responsibilities, and
also reviews proposals to impose greater responsibilities on pharmaceutical IP
holders.
A. Criticismsof IP Holders
1.

The United Nations: High Level Paneland Special Rapporteurs

The United Nations Secretary-General's 2016 High Level Panel on Access to
Medicines identified a variety of obstacles to access to medicines. Some were non5. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1563, 1567 (2013) ("[S]ince the TRIPS Agreement entered into force in January 1995, it not
only has taken away the wide policy space less developed countries once enjoyed at the international
level, but it has also resulted in needless deaths and suffering to patients that have acquired either the
human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
"AIDS")."); see also Burcu Kilic, Defending the Spirit of the Doha Declarationin Free Trade
Agreements: Trans-PacificPartnershipand Access to Affordable Medicines, 12 LoY. U. Cm. INT'L
L. Riv. 23, 30 (2014) ("To a great extent, the patent regime has been linked to rising healthcare costs
and problems regarding access to medicine. Many developing countries, especially the least
developed ones, were faced with public health crises. These countries have experienced the
difficulties related to the increasing prices of medicines. It became evident that patents substantially
delayed market entry of generic medicines, raising costs and reducing access. As a result, the
Agreement has come under fierce criticism.").
6. Alexander Stimac, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: The Death-Knell of Generic
Pharmaceuticals?,49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 853, 874-75 (2016) ("Rohit Malpani, the director of
policy and analysis at the MSF Access Campaign, has stated that '[t]he TPP is the most damaging
trade agreement we have ever seen in terms of access to medicines for poor people.').
7. Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High Priceof "'Free"Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements
andAccess to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 210 (2013).
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IP barriers to access, such as "[r]egulatory inefficiencies, poor health education,
unavailability of health insurance and insufficient financial protection for those
who have to pay for some or all of their treatment," as well as "fees, profits, taxes
and tariffs along the supply chain"; the Panel also observed that millions of patients
remain unable to access essential off-patent medicine. 8 However, it focused most
of its analysis on pharmaceutical IP. This may reflect the nature of the Panel's
mandate: the Panel was tasked with addressing tension between the "justifiable
rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public health in
all the reasons why
the context of health technologies, ' rather than "analyzing
1°
health technologies are not available [n]or affordable."
The Panel concluded that pharmaceutical IP rights can obstruct access to
medicines. It began by observing that "the obligation to grant patents on medicines
and other health technologies would affect the availability and affordability of
health technologies," and "had a clear potential to strain national budgets and to
place health technologies out of the reach of those in need."' 1 This emphasis on
the access-constricting effects of IP continues throughout the report. The Panel
goes on to assert that there is a "misalignment between public health objectives
and trade and intellectual property protection"' 2 and that "the application of patent
protections.., can conflict with the right to health in rich and poor countries
alike."" 3 The report also explicitly endorses the primacy of health claims over
property rights, stating that "[t]ensions between ministries responsible for the
promotion of trade and the protection and enforcement of intellectual property on
the one hand and those responsible for public health should not result in the
prioritization of trade over health," and that "[t]he very nature of fundamental' 4
human rights requires that they outweigh private interests under national law." 1
The Panel ultimately, however, elected to reaffirm the importance of the TRIPS
Agreement and the flexibilities it includes, rather than rejecting pharmaceutical IP
rights in medicines.
Some members of the Panel would have gone further and eliminated IP rights
over a subset of essential medicines, and potentially over all health technologies.
In a commentary annexed to the report, Jorge Bermudez, Winnie Byanyima and
Shiba Phurailatpam, three members of the Panel, describe "the current R&D and
access system - based on intellectual property (IP) protection as embodied in the
WTO's TRIPS Agreement and aggravated by free trade and investment
8.

REPORT ON ACCESS, supra note

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at4.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 24.

1, at 15-16.
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agreements and treaties" as a "systemic failure."' 15 In a separate commentary,
Bermudez and Byanyima argue that, instead, "medicines on national lists or on the
WHO Model List for Essential Medicines should be exempted from IP
protection," 16 a proposal they assert was supported by two-thirds of the Panel but
excluded from the final report. They likewise argue that the UN should examine
how "IP constraints can be removed from all health technologies while protecting
the justifiable rights of inventors."' 17 Underscoring their belief that IP and pricing
constitute the crucial barriers to access, they criticize the Panel's claim that
unavailability of health insurance constitutes a barrier to access, stating that
"insurance does not protect people from the high cost of medicines nor does it
guarantee access to the medicines they need even in high income countries."' 1 8 In
an individual commentary, Phurailatpam underscores his view that the pricing of
patented medicines, rather than the resources available to patients to purchase
medicines, should be the focus of critical attention. 19
The two most recent former United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the Right
to Health, Paul Hunt and Anand Grover, have similarly argued that uniquely strong
duties apply to pharmaceutical IP holders.2" In one article, Grover and his coauthors argue that "[t]ransnational pharmaceutical companies, along with states,
play the largest role in determining whether medicines are equitably available and
accessible," 21 and then go on to assert that
[M]any medicines currently available on the market are simply
too expensive for millions around the world to afford. Many
medicines available in the developing world are only available to
a small percentage of the population due to economic inequities.
The profit-seeking behavior of pharmaceutical companies
exacerbates this problem. In most cases, the price reductions
required to make drugs affordable to a broader class of people in
15. Id. at 53.
16. Id. at 61.
17. Id. at 61-62.
18. Id. at 55.
19. Id. at 63 ("Several people who put pressure on the work of the Panel accused it of ignoring
the role of health systems in limiting access. In the case of patented medicines - it is my own personal
experience and that of the multitude of patients in need of patented medicines - that the cascade of
misery that we endure in being pushed from pillar to post, in navigating public and private healthcare
systems and complicated health coverage and ultimately facing death or destitution, starts with or is
certainly made far worse, by the pricing and restricted availability of those patented medicines.").
20. Anand Grover et al., PharmaceuticalCompaniesand Global Lack ofAccess to Medicines:
StrengtheningAccountability Under the Right to Health, 40 J.L. MED. & ETMcs 234, 236 (2012);
Joo-Young Lee & Paul Hunt, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in
Relation to Access to Medicines, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 220 (2012).
21. Grover et al., supra note 20, at 235.
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the developing world are not offset by the resultant increase in
sales volume. Simply stated, in most of the developing world, it is
more profitable to sell drugs to the very wealthy at high prices
than it is to sell cheaper drugs to a greater number of people. As a
result, medicines remain unaffordable for the vast majority of
people in many parts of the world. While this might be an
acceptable outcome for certain commodities, such as luxury
goods, it is completely unacceptable for life-saving medicines.
Therefore, in order to effectively address the global lack of access
to medicines, the role pharmaceutical companies play in the
international intellectual property regime must be critically
examined.22
Grover et al. appear to place a special responsibility for providing access to
medicines on pharmaceutical companies and focus in particular on pharmaceutical
companies' conduct with respect to intellectual property rights. They also argue
that IP holders who do not do what they need to do should be subject to external
constraints. 23
Another former Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, took a similar position in a
2012 article. Hunt and Joo-Young Lee argue that:
[S]ociety has a legitimate expectation that the patent holder of a
life-saving medicine will not only enjoy the privileges arising
from the patent but also fulfill the corresponding responsibilities.
The crucial right-to-health responsibility is to take all reasonable
steps to make the medicine as accessible as possible, as soon as
possible, to all those in need, within a viable business model. As
soon as the new medicine is marketed at higher prices (usually in
high-income countries), the patent holder has a right-to-health
responsibility to put in place a range of mechanisms, such as
differential pricing between and within countries, to enhance
access for those who cannot afford those prices. Also, the patent
holder has a right-to-health responsibility to develop formulations
for children, the elderly, pregnant and lactating women, and
extremes of climate. For the duration of the patent, only the patent
holder is authorized (with limited exceptions) to take these steps.
Thus, the agreement between society and patent holder includes a
22. Id.
23. Id. at 236 ("It is increasingly clear that the structure of the international intellectual property
regime must be modified and that reasonable constraints be placed on the behavior of pharmaceutical
companies in order to allow for adequate levels of industry competition.").
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responsibility on the patent holder to take these steps,
expeditiously and effectively, by way of deliberate, concrete, and
targeted measures. If the patent is worked without these steps
being taken (i.e., without a range of mechanisms being put in place
to enhance access, and without steps being taken to develop
formulations for children, etc.), then the patent holder is in breach
of its right-to-health responsibilities. Of course, the success of the
patent holder's actions will sometimes depend upon States,
donors, and others in the pharmaceutical sector fulfilling their
responsibilities. Nonetheless, the patent holder has a right-tohealth responsibility to do what it reasonably can.24
While Lee and Hunt note that other actors also have responsibilities, their
focus is on the IP holder, who "has a right-to-health responsibility to do what it
reasonably can."2 5
2.

Academics

Many academic commentators have condemned pharmaceutical IP holders for
depriving the global poor of essential medicines. A representative example is
Chuan-Feng Wu, who asserts that
the cavalier conduct of [transnational pharmaceutical
corporations] is... the primary cause of right-to-health
violations, especially the right to access medicines. For example,
because pharmaceutical leaders employ strategies, such as patent
protection, to maximize profits and returns on investments to
benefit the corporation and its shareholders, they are responsible
for the high prices charged for life-saving drugs. Studies also show
that the poor's healthcare needs are barely met in patent-based
markets because patent holders (i.e.,
pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical corporations), who are entitled to control the
prices on all sales of their products, sometimes abuse their power
of market dominance by charging excessive prices.26
Other commentators similarly assert that intellectual property protections
"have a particularly debilitating effect on how lower income countries provide
24. Lee & Hunt, supra note 20, at 228-29.

25. Id.
26. Chuan-Feng Wu, TransnationalPharmaceuticalCorporations'Legal and Moral Human
Rights Responsibilities in Relation to Access to Medicines, AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &

POL'Y 77,90 (2012).
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their citizens access to life-saving medication" 27; that "[p]rohibitive drug prices
are often the result of strong intellectual property protection" 28; and that "[i]n many
parts of the world, overly restrictive intellectual property regimes place essential
29
medicines beyond the reach of those who need them.,
Some commentators have not only criticized pharmaceutical 1IP holders but
provided specific proposals that would impose burdens on them. Lisa Forman
echoes the arguments made by Bermudez, Byanyima, and Phurailatpam,
contending that because "existing policy initiatives have failed to adequately
respond to the impact of trade-related intellectual property rights on access to
medicines. . . bolder measures are required, including suspending the application
of trade-related intellectual property rights to essential drugs for low- and middleincome countries., 30 Talha Syed and Terry Fisher, meanwhile, argue that
"international institutions, such as. . . the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPS') in particular... must be reformed so as to
eliminate their complicity in unjustifiable harms to the residents of developing
countries." 3 1
3.

Activists

A poster tweeted by Melinda St. Louis, the Director of International
Campaigns at Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, states a pharmaceutical
exceptionalist view in particularly striking form: "Pfizer+Obama's TPP=Death for
People with AIDS.",32 This poster refers to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
proposed international trade agreement, and alleges that the TPP would permit
27. Christina Bucci, Responsible Patent Protections:PreservingPublic Health Objectives in
the Trans-PacificPartnershipAgreement, 26 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 213, 214
(2013).
28. Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents,andAccess to EssentialMedicines:A Long
Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27 (2002).
29. Tamar Ezer et al., PromotingPublic Health Through ClinicalLegal Education:Initiatives
in South Africa, Thailand, and Ukraine, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 27.
30. Lisa Forman, The Inadequate Global Policy Response to Trade-Related Intellectual
PropertyRights: Impact on Access to Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 31 MD. J.
INT'LL. 8, 9 (2016).
31. Fisher & Syed, supra note 4, at 662; see also Ruth Lopert & Deborah Gleeson, The High
Price of "Free" Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
199, 199 (2013) ("The proliferation of post-TRIPS bilateral and regional 'free' trade agreements
(FTAs) has been characterized by a progressive 'ratcheting up' of IP protections for pharmaceuticals,
with provisions intended to prolong monopolies, support high prices and frustrate market entry of
generic medicines -- all of which undermine access to affordable medicines").
32. Melinda St. Louis (@MelindaGTW), TWITTER (July 3, 2015, 3:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/MelindaGTW/status/616682828521025536; see also Margaret Flowers, Stopping
The Trans-PacificPartnershipEssential To Universal Health Care, PoPULAR RESISTANCE (Sept. 4,
2013),
https://popularresistance.org/stopping-the-trans-pacific-partnership-essential-to-universalhealth-care/ (using the same image).
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pharmaceutical firms like Pfizer to worsen access to medicines for people living
with AIDS. Medecins Sans Frontieres, meanwhile, referred to pharmaceutical
companies' attempts to limit compulsory licensing (a patent law doctrine that
permits governments to grant licenses without the patent-holder's consent) in
South Africa as "one of the most stark acts of corporate inhumanity. 33
B. IP-FocusedLaw andPolicy Proposals
The claims in Part L.A that pharmaceutical IP holders are wrongfully impeding
global health has prompted proposals to either weaken IP holders' rights or to
impose correlative responsibilities. This Subpart reviews these proposals.
1.

Eliminationof lP in some or all health technologies

A contribution to the High Level Panel's deliberations by the legal academic
Brook Baker and several advocacy groups argues that intellectual property
protections for health technologies should be completely eliminated. Baker and his
co-submitters call for "eventually exempting all health technologies for all health
conditions from IP protections in international, regional, bilateral, and national
law,",34 "an explicit exemption of medical technologies from patent, copyright, and
data protections in the WTO TRIPS Agreement, in trade agreements, and in
national legislation,, 35 and "unenforceability of investor rights concerning health
technologies. 3 6 They also provide a detailed proposal that would revise the TRIPS
agreement to eliminate IP rights. In support of this proposal, they claim that IP
rights are inefficient at driving innovation and that "global, regional, bilateral, and
national IP regimes adversely affect universal, equitable, and affordable access to
health technologies, which should be treated as a global public good." 37 While they
33. David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations,
InternationalLaw, and the Controversyover Placebo-ControlledHIV Clinical Trials in Developing
Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 302 n.16 (2001); see also Brook K. Baker, International
Collaborationon IP/Access to Medicines:Birth of South Africa s Fix the PatentLaws Campaign,60
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 297, 329-30 (2016) (observing that activist groups such as the Treatment Action
Campaign and Medecins Sans Frontieres "have chastened the multinational pharmaceutical industry
for its continuing, pernicious, and backdoor efforts to prioritize monopoly profits over people's
affordable access to essential public health goods"); Siddartha Rao, Closing the Global Drug Gap:
A PragmaticApproach to the Access to Medicines Problem, 3 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 13
(2008) (discussing "the success of activist groups in generating negative publicity towards
pharmaceutical companies trying to enforce patents").
34. Brook Baker and Health GAP, Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General's
2016,
26,
February
Medicines,
to
Access
Panel
on
High-Level
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/26/z73kpodxk4jw96mhqe2tivq0sdl g3v
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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acknowledge that their proposal may be difficult to implement politically, they
argue that it is preferable to incremental reforms. Their proposal is also endorsed
by other contributors to the Panel's deliberation.3"
Other contributors offer the more limited suggestion that IP rights in essential
medicines should be eliminated or severely restricted. As previously mentioned,
Bermudez, Byanyima, and Phurailatpam propose the complete elimination of IP
rights in relation to essential medicines. Less drastically, Chandni Raina, from the
Center for WTO Studies at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, argues that
patents in medicines that are essential for treating a disease should be subject to
mandatory licensing, which would allow any pharmaceutical company to produce
such medicines after paying a reasonable royalty.3 9
2.

IP-focused taxes and regulatory mandates

Rather than weakening property rights in IP, some contributors to the High
Level Panel, as well as some of the members themselves, argue for imposing
correlative responsibilities on holders of IP. One such proposal, offered by the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and endorsed by other organizations, would
require "compliance with a research mandate as a condition for maintaining
intellectual property rights on medical products., 40 Their mandate would have the
following structure:
- For a company in possession of any pharmaceutical patents to
maintain the rights to those patents it must, on an annual basis, file
information confirming the following:

38. Saoirse Fitzpatrick and STOPAIDS, Contribution to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral's
High-Level
Panel on Access to Medicines,
February 26,
2016,
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/26/saoirse-fitzpatrick (endorsing Baker proposal on
behalf of "STOPAIDS, Health Action International, Health Gap (Global Access Project), Wemos,
UAEM Europe, Youth Stop AIDS, ACTSA, Health Poverty Action, Commons Network, Grupo de
Ativistas em Tratamentos, Coalition Plus, Restless Development, TlInterational, Aids Orphan,
Declaration de Berne, Medicines in Europe Forum, European Public Health Alliance, PRAKSIS,
EKPIZO, Verein Demokratischer Pharmazeutinnen und Pharmazeuten, European AIDS Treatment
Group, Global Youth AIDS Coalition, Health Projects for Latvia, Salud Por Derecho, Global Health
Advocates").
39. Chandni Raina, Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel
on
Access
to
Medicines,
February
22,
2016,
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/22/contributionchandni-rainaon-behalf-of-thecentre-for-wto-studies.
40. Marcus Low on behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign, Contribution to the United
Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, February 22, 2016,
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/27/marcus-low. The contribution was also endorsed
by SECTION27 and Knowledge Ecology International. Id.
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* That over the last 12 months the company spent a minimum of
30% of revenue on R&D and
- Spending on R&D over the last 12 months was at least double
the combined spending on marketing and advertising over the
same period and
* Spending on R&D over the last 12 months was at least double
the company's profits.
* For the purpose of this mechanism investment on R&D must
include direct contributions made to approved medical R&D
grant-making institutions at the national level or as part of a UN
agency or a partnership with a UN agency... A minimum of 20%
of the patent holder's R&D investment must be contributed to
such institutions. Such institutions should be obliged to invest
these funds in R&D relating to areas of greatest medical need.
• In cases where fewer than four companies hold a license or
licenses to market a specific patented medical product, these
provisions will apply to all license holders in exactly the same way
as it applies to the original patent holder.4 '
In its contribution, TAC also reviewed a variety of other proposed R&D
mandates on pharmaceutical IP holders. These include a proposed Brazilian "tax
on pharmaceutical profits that would go toward an R&D fund... used only for
R&D on medicines and vaccines that address public health needs of developing
countries ' ' 42 and a 1996 proposal by then-Rep. Bernie Sanders that would impose
43
"minimum R&D requirements on companies that sell drugs in the United States,"
with the requirements depending on "patent protection, orphan drug status, and the
magnitude of sales." 44 They also discussed mandates that fund pharmaceutical
R&D by taxing antibiotic use or mineral resource exploitation.4 5
Fisher and Syed, whose work is discussed in Part I, submitted a contribution
advocating a regulatory approach similar to TAC's, but which focuses on
outcomes achieved as a result of the firm's products rather than on R&D spending.
They advocate requiring all pharmaceutical firms to "demonstrate compliance,
annually, with a 'social-responsibility index,' which index would consist of the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

18:2 (2019)

ratio between (1) the total number of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs)
saved as a result of the consumption of the firm's products during the year and (2)
the firm's global gross revenues during the year., 46 They would allow a "cap-andtrade" system for DALYs, where a firm whose products saved insufficient DALYs
could buy them from another finrn. 47
Finally, Grover et al. proposed a UN framework convention on global health
that would incorporate a tax on pharmaceutical companies. Grover et al.'s
proposed convention would establish a "judicial committee with the authority to
issue binding judicial decisions enforceable under international law" 48; the

committee would have the authority to hear complaints that pharmaceutical
companies have violated the right to health, and provide remedies including
"compensation for victims, guarantees of non-repetition, commitments to research
and development priorities for neglected diseases, and the granting of compulsory
licenses., 49 These remedies would be financed by "taxes levied on pharmaceutical
companies by the state in which they are domiciled,, 50 and "based upon the
companies' compliance with the obligations in the framework convention;
companies with poor records would be required to pay more taxes than those who
fare better under review by the convention body.'
3.

IP-focusedsocial responsibilityand ethical consumerism initiatives

Several organizations have proposed campaigns that leverage market
mechanisms and consumer power to pressure pharmaceutical IP right-holders to
promote global health. One such campaign is the Global Health Impact scorecard,
proposed by Nicole Hassoun, which would label products made by firms that hold
IP rights according to those firms' contribution to global health. 52 Hassoun
submitted a contribution to the High Level Panel arguing that this approach should

46. William Fisher and Talha Syed, Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General's
High-Level
Panel
on
Access
to
Medicines,
February
28,
2016,
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/28/jaime-espin.
47. Id.
48. Grover et al., supranote 20, at 246.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Nicole Hassoun, Individual Responsibilityfor Promoting Global Health: The Casefor A
New Kind of Socially Conscious Consumption, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 323 (2016) (proposing
the use of "the Global Health Impact rating system for pharmaceutical companies' key impacts on
global health to incentivize positive change" via "a Global Health Impact certification and labeling
campaign" within which "the best companies, in a given year, will be given a license to use a Global
Health Impact label on all of their products - everything from lip balm to food supplements").
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54
be part of the Panel's efforts. 53 A similar proposal has been advanced by Nir Eyal.
Another campaign, focused on universities rather than pharmaceutical
manufacturers, is the Universities Allied for Essential Medicine (UAEM)
scorecard, which evaluates universities by how well their IP licensing proposals
promote access to medicines. 55 UAEM has also developed what it calls an
Equitable Access License, which requires IP licensees to grant their exclusive
rights in the drugs they produce using that IP back to the university.5 6 A number
of universities, as well as the American Association of Medical Colleges, the
National Institute of Health, and the Centers for Disease Control, have endorsed57a
commitment to promoting access to university-held IP in developing countries.

II. EVALUATING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IP-FOCUSED PROPOSALS
An implicit premise of the IP-focused proposals above is that pharmaceutical
IP holders have a greater responsibility to promote global health than other firms
or individuals do. This premise requires defense, as we can see by examining
Fisher and Syed's proposal discussed in Part I.B. If Fisher and Syed's proposal
applied to all firms, Coca-Cola (as an example) would have a negative social
responsibility index, since consuming its products does not avert DALYs and
arguably causes them.58 Many other firms, like Gucci, would at best have a zero
social responsibility index. Yet Fisher and Syed's proposal would impose
53. Nicole Hassoun, Contribution to the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel
2016,
16,
February
to
Medicines,
on
Access
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/16/contributionn-hassoun.
54. Nir Eyal, Global-HealthImpact Labels, in GLOBAL JUSTICE IN BIOETHICs 241-78 (Ezekiel
J. Emanuel & Joseph Millum eds. 2012).
55. See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102
CORNELL L. REv. 271, 318 (2017) (discussing the "establishment of the activist group Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), which has pushed universities to consider how their patent
policies affect global health, and which helped craft--and convince universities to sign--two licensing
policy statements related to the dissemination of medical technologies," and observing that "UAEM
now issues an annual report card that grades universities on their global health impact in an effort to
increase transparency about university policies").
56. Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program:A New
Model for HumanitarianLicensing at the University Level, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 281, 296-98 (2009)
(describing and evaluating the Equitable Access License).
57. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many PatentsDoes It Take to Make A Drug? Follow-on
PharmaceuticalPatents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 299, 310
(2010) (describing commitment signed by AAMC that "'[u]niversities have a social compact with
society' that gives them 'a responsibility... to share the fruits' of their inventions with 'the world's
poor,' and also describing endorsement by the CDC and NIH of the 2009 Statement of Principles and
Strategies for the Equitable Dissemination of Medical Technologies, which contains similar
language).
58. See Gitanjali M. Singh et al., Estimated Global, Regional, andNational Disease Burdens
Related to Sugar-SweetenedBeverage Consumption in 2010, 132 CIRCULATION 639, 639 (2015).
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obligations on pharmaceutical firms but not on Coca-Cola or Gucci. This is so even
though Coca-Cola and Gucci could both improve global health for patients like
Phumeza by, for instance, donating profits to enable the global poor to purchase
medicines or to obtain needed surgeries. An identical critique applies to taxes and
regulatory mandates, like Grover's proposal, that fall exclusively on
pharmaceutical firms. And a similar critique applies to the proposals for
eliminating IP - Coca-Cola and Gucci could improve the financial circumstances
of the global poor tremendously if they granted the poor access to the lucrative IP
they control.
UAEM's "University Report Card," which assigns failing global health grades
to the University of Cincinnati and Wake Forest University, " but assigns no grade
at all to universities without global health programs, faces a similar criticism.
Wake Forest spends money promoting global health goals, even though it may
spend less than the top-scoring universities, 60 whereas these other universities do
not spend on global health at all. Castigating Wake Forest as a failure for doing
too little while ignoring universities that do nothing at all requires defense.
This Part will examine five potential justifications for focusing on holders of
pharmaceutical IP rather than on other firms or wealthy individuals. These
justifications are that pharmaceutical IP holders, unlike other firms or individuals:
a)

own what patients need;

b)

interact with patients;

c)

can help without incurring significant costs;

d)

have a professional responsibility to help; and/or

e)

have caused patients' plight by creating barriers to access.

I argue that none of these justifications succeed in differentiating IP holders
from others who can help.
A. Ownership of what patients need
Grover et al. claim that "unlike in many other forms of intellectual
property... the chemical compounds that constitute drugs are necessary to protect
the health and the human rights of millions of people.",6 1 They use this claim as a
justification for IP-focused policies.
59. See Ayres & Ouellette, supranote 55.
60. See
Wake
Forest
School
of
Medicine,
Global
https://school.wakehealth.edu/About-the-School/Global-Health/Funding.
61. Grover et al., supra note 20, at 236.

Health

Funding,
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This argument cannot justify the broad elimination of all IP rights in health
technologies that Baker and others defend, because many health technologies are
not necessary to protect health or human rights. Some are "me too" drugs that
provide only marginal benefits.62 Others are drugs63 for conditions like baldness,
treatments which are not essential to human rights.
Even when deployed in defense of proposals to remove IP rights over
medicines that do protect health and human rights, this argument faces three
additional problems. First, many pharmaceuticals represent an additional treatment
option without being necessary for improving health. As an example, both older
and newer medications can treat HIV, although older medications are often less
effective or more toxic. 64 Similarly, older, off-patent antipsychotic drugs can be as
effective as patented treatments.6 5
Second, property other than pharmaceutical IP can also be harnessed to protect
health and human rights. Within the pharmaceutical supply chain, retailers could
sell pharmaceuticals more cheaply and raw material producers could lower their
prices.66 Outside the pharmaceutical supply chain, wealthy firms and individuals
could transfer their property rights in non-pharmaceutical IP, money, or real
property to the global poor to enable them to purchase patented drugs or improve
their health in other ways.
Third, there can be compelling reasons to recognize property rights in
essential goods-not only essential medicines, but also food, water, housing, and
non-pharmaceutical health care. Where individuals lack the ability to pay,
recognizing and enforcing a collective responsibility to assist is typically
preferable to abrogating property rights for specific essential goods. Abrogating
property rights in essential goods would create perverse incentives. For instance,
if food could not be owned but inessential goods like Gucci handbags could, there
would be an incentive to produce handbags instead of food. It would also produce
dubious distributive outcomes, as wealthier consumers in developed countries
would receive essential goods at low or no cost. This parallels the problem with
using price caps, rather than financial assistance, to ensure that poorer consumers

62. Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 183 (2016) ("In a recent five-year period, 67% of the 'new' drugs
approved by the FDA were 'me-too' drugs - drugs that are slight chemical variants of their
predecessor and that produce essentially the same medical results in patients").
63. Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing PatentPerspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REv. 1047, 1063
(2009) (discussing the exemption of "'lifestyle' drugs, such as those to treat baldness, acne, or erectile
dysfunction" from some access to medicines proposals).
64. See Govind Persad, The Medical Cost Pandemic: Why Limiting Access to Cost-Effective
Treatments Hurts the GlobalPoor, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 559, 563-65 (2015).

65. Francis Collins, Opportunitiesfor Research andNIH, 327 SCIENCE 36 (2010).
66. This does not imply anything about retailers' or producers' relative contribution to prices.
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can access essential goods like food, water, or electricity.67 Last, abrogating
property rights in essential goods would lead to a misalignment between aid and
needs: if a firm has IP rights in essential medicines, but poor patients need offpatent drugs, it would be preferable to have the firm transfer cash to the poor rather
than transferring or not enforcing its 1IP rights.
B. Interactionwith patients
The suggestion that interacting with poor patients can generate duties to assist
is familiar from other contexts, such as clinical research conducted by
pharmaceutical firms abroad,6 8 and is therefore worth examining as a basis for the
claim that pharmaceutical IP holders owe special duties to the poor. In the law,
friendly interaction with others, or participation in a common undertaking, can
sometimes generate obligations to assist.69 However, there is no obvious tie of
friendship between pharmaceutical IP holders and poor patients, nor are the two
involved in a common venture. The law of unjust enrichment also indicates that
reciprocity can be a basis for duties to assist;7" but pharmaceutical IP holders are
not attempting to profit substantially from the global poor.
The most plausible basis for the idea that pharmaceutical IP holders have a
special relationship with the global poor involves their intervention in countries
where the global poor live in order to assert their IP rights. When an IP holder goes
into court in South Africa or India to assert its rights, its interaction with that nation
might appear to be a basis for assigning it a special obligation. In contrast, a
wealthy private individual or a firm that makes its money purely or primarily via
domestic commerce (think of Shake Shack or a local taxi company) would not
have similar special obligations.
Appeals to mere interaction, however, faces two of the problems discussed in
the prior Subpart. First, others-such as pharmaceutical retailers and nonpharmaceutical firms that do business in developing countries-interact more with
patients than pharmaceutical 1P holders do, and would be subject to equally strong
duties to assist. More importantly, allowing interaction to generate a special
responsibility will produce a perverse incentive to avoid interaction. To see how
67. JOSEPH HEATH, ECONOMICS WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, ch. 7 (2010) ("[F]iddling with the price
of electricity is a terrible way of addressing the underlying problem of distributive justice, simply
because the benefits of low prices are available to everyone, not just those who are in need.").
68. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, RETHINKING THE ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH: WIDENING THE
LENS 255 (2010) (discussing the "interaction principle"); James V. Lavery, Putting International
Research Ethics Guidelines to Work for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 4 YALE J. HEALTH

POL'Y, L.& ETHICS 319, 321 (2004).
69. Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causationand CounterfactualBaselines,40 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1181, 1186 (2003); cf Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976) (holding that
there is a duty to assist companions in a common undertaking).
70. Id. at 1187.
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making responsibility contingent on interaction can provide perverse incentives,
consider the following example discussed by Alan Wertheimer and Thomas
Pogge:
A filmmaker wishes to produce a documentary about behavior of
fishermen whose boats are in distress. He believes that the film
will help others avoid counterproductive panic-induced behavior.
A successful film requires that the fishermen not be rescued until
it is too late. The film crew flies to a location off the coast of a
poor country and waits for a radio signal of a ship in distress.
When it receives a distress signal, the film maker radios back with
the following proposal. If the fishermen agree, the filmmaker will
flip a coin. If it comes up heads, the filmmaker's crew will fly by
helicopter and save them. If it comes up tails, it will fly by
helicopter and film them and make no effort to save them, but will
remain in the area until another ship is in distress and it will then
save those fishermen. Because the fishermen have no better
option, they readily agree.71
Unlike pharmaceutical IP holders, the filmmaker in this case is not only
interacting with the fishermen, but potentially benefiting substantially from his
interaction with them. Nonetheless, examining this case is useful because if the
filmmaker lacks an obligation to aid even though he potentially benefits from the
interaction, pharmaceutical IP holders-who merely interact without substantially
benefiting-will also lack a special obligation to aid.
Wertheimer and Pogge evaluate the above example in opposing ways. Pogge
recognizes that imposing a duty to assist on the filmmaker once he interacts with
the fishermen (regardless of how the coin lands) would produce a strong incentive
to avoid interacting, but elects to bite the bullet, stating that duties sometimes
produce perverse incentives and that "morality cannot plausibly be purged of such
counterproductivity entirely.", 72 In contrast, Wertheimer argues that "this is not the
sort of counterproductivity that we have come to expect of a sensible morality. 7 3
He goes on to assert that
In the case at hand, the moral requirement to save the fishermen
does not serve to protect the fishermen from being sacrificed for
the benefit of others; it leads to the preventable deaths of the
71. WERTHEIMER, supra note 68, at 245-46 (paraphrasing Thomas Pogge, Testing Our Drugs
on the PoorAbroad,in EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 (Jennifer Hawkins & Ezekiel
J. Emanuel eds. 2008)).
72. Pogge, supra note 71, at 122.
73. WERTHEIMER, supra note 68, at 247.
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fishermen themselves. If it is hard to have confidence in a morality
that allows that allows filmmakers to deliberately refrain from
rescuing fishermen in distress, it is also hard to have confidence
in a morality that renders it certain that the fishermen will not be
rescued.74
If we find Wertheimer's reasoning plausible in the fisherman example, the
case for rejecting interaction-based duties is even stronger in the case of IP holders
who--unlike the fisherman--do not derive a benefit from their interactions with
the global poor. We can see the counterproductive results Wertheimer identified
in the context of Fisher and Syed's suggestion, where a pharmaceutical company
that is judged to under-contribute to global health would receive a lower "social
responsibility rating" than a firm like Coca-Cola that does not contribute to global
health at all. On this approach, a firm producing multiple products would have an
incentive to divest its pharmaceutical division, or stop producing pharmaceuticals:
such activities expose the firm to a "moral rescue burden" it would not otherwise
have faced. 7
C. Ability to assist at lower burden to oneself
The capacity to forestall a harm at low cost to oneself is a recognized basis for
moral and legal obligations.7 6 One way that pharmaceutical IP holders could be
able to forestall harm at a lower cost than other property holders involves the nonrival nature of IP: allowing patients to access a patented drug does not prevent the
patent-holder from selling or manufacturing medicines, whereas allowing poor
patients to access money or real property does prevent others from using that
money or property.7 7
This argument faces two problems. First, it does not explain why
pharmaceutical IP holders have a greater responsibility to assist than holders of
non-pharmaceutical IP, which is equally non-rival. Allowing patients to access
other forms of IP could free patients to purchase medicines or health care that they
need. The pharmaceutical exceptionalist needs to explain why requiring
74. Id.
75. Cf Pogge, supra note 71, at 122 (acknowledging that "[t]he filmmaker has no earthly
reason to be near the ocean with his radio equipment and helicopter if this can win him no exciting
filming opportunity, but can only slap him with a moral rescue burden.").
76. See Rebecca E. Wolitz, A CorporateDuty to Rescue: BiopharmaceuticalCompanies and
Access to Medications, 94 IND. L.J. 1163 (2019); Wilder Corp. of Delaware v. Thompson Drainage
& Levee Dist., 658 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[L]iability for inflicting a harm should come to
rest on the party that could, at the lowest cost, have prevented the harm in the first place").
77. Kevin Outterson has developed this non-rivalry argument in PharmaceuticalArbitrage:
Balancing Access and Innovation in InternationalPrescriptionDrug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 193, 199 (2005).
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pharmaceutical companies to share their IP rights with the global poor is more
justified than requiring firms like Coca-Cola to share their lucrative IP.
The nonrivalry argument might also fail to differentiate pharmaceutical IP
from some forms of real property, because the technically rivalrous use of some
real property imposes little cost on the better-off. Historically, the poor were
permitted to enter land they did not own, glean crops that would otherwise go
unused,7 8 and doctrines like adverse possession are often understood as resting on
the benefits of allowing access to unused property.7 9 In the health context, an
example of non-rivalrous use might be the use of medical equipment or expired
but still usable pharmaceuticals that are currently thrown out rather than being
made available for reuse. 80
Second, it does not acknowledge that even though IP is non-rival, allowing
patients to bypass IP rights could create a disincentive to innovate. Robert Merges
argues that the view that "there is no need for property where goods are nonrivalrous" ignores the role of IP in stimulating new contributions.81 While
completely eliminating IP rights in medicines would not prevent researchers and
corporations from manufacturing and selling the medicines they discover, it could
reduce the incentive to engage in discovery.
Another argument would appeal to the great wealth of some pharmaceutical
firms.82 While this argument does make some pharmaceutical IP holders more
appropriate targets for responsibility than many other actors, such as the
governments of less developed countries, it also fails to establish that
pharmaceutical IP rightsholders should be the unique object of duties. Firms like
Coca-Cola and Gucci also are very wealthy-wealthier than many holders of
pharmaceutical IP, such as startup firms and university researchers.
D. Professionalobligations
Another potential basis for special obligations involves the fact that some
individuals who work for pharmaceutical companies are members of professions
who owe special obligations to meet the health needs of the global poor. For
78. Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 245,
284 (2010) ("The common law also deprived a landowner of a remedy for a trespass when use of
private resources benefited the public without harm to the landowner. Blackstone, for example, wrote
that the "common law and custom of England" held that it was no trespass for the poor to enter
another's land after harvest to glean another's grounds.").
79. See Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peflalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent
Law, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1437, 1462 (2013).
80. See Persad, supranote 64, at 571-76.
81. ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 37 (2011).
82. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, The Globalizationof Health Law: The Case of Permissibilityof
Placebo-BasedResearch, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 185 (2000) (noting the "justice issues raised by
the pricing policies of wealthy pharmaceutical companies for sale of drugs in the developing world").
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instance, if pharmaceutical companies employ physicians and nurses to carry out
clinical trials, these physicians and nurses may owe a professional ethical duty to
poor patients, a duty whose fulfillment requires the provision of professional
services rather than through the provision of other goods. 83 This could be a basis
for imposing greater obligations on pharmaceutical IP holders than on Coca-Cola
or Gucci. Even if pharmaceutical firms' employees are not directly interacting with
the global poor, they are departing from their duty to focus on healing the sick
when they work as pharmaceutical employees. In contrast, it might be argued,
designers at Gucci do not have role-based professional duties to the global poor,
and so Gucci does not have obligations to serve the needs of the global poor.
This argument faces several problems. First, it is contentious whether the
duties of professionals should take the specific form of providing professional
services. It is plausible that professionals instead have duties to serve the public
good, but that these professional duties can be fulfilled in other ways. 84 Second,
many-probably most-employees of pharmaceutical firms are not physicians or
nurses, and so do not have the specific role-based obligations to the global poor
that physicians do. Last, even physicians and nurses at pharmaceutical firms do
not have a permission to set back the firm's economic position in order to fulfill
their professional duties to promote global health, just as they do not have a
permission to set back the corporation's economic position in order to fulfill other
special responsibilities they might have. (Analogously, in-house lawyers are
limited in their ability to provide pro bono services on company time, and such
services must typically be authorized. 85)
E. Past conduct
Another way to support the claim that pharmaceutical IP holders owe a
distinctive obligation to patients like Phumeza is to look to their past conduct. If
pharmaceutical IP holders' conduct has brought about the bad health outcomes that
83. See, e.g., AM. MED. Ass'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opinion 9.065Caring for the Poor (2011), https://joumalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/ama-code-medical-ethicsopinion-physicians-duty-poor/2011-08 ("Each physician has an obligation to share in providing care
to the indigent."). Some scholars also suggest that these duties apply to physicians conducting clinical
research on pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in
ClinicalResearch, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 424, 425 (2006).
84. See WILLIAM MACASKILL, DOING GOOD BETTER 77 (2015) (arguing that physicians can
often save more lives by "earning to give" - i.e. donating a portion of their salaries to effective
charities - than by providing pro bono services).
85. See Ronald T. Y. Moon, Access to Civil Justice:Is There A Solution?, 88 JUDICATURE 155,
157 (2005) ("Survey results of corporate legal departments indicated 40 percent in-house pro bono
participation with another 40 percent indicating plans to start in-house pro bono programs. Of those
reporting active in-house pro bono participation, 83 percent permit counsel to perform pro bono legal
services on company time.").
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produce the need for health care, this could support the imposition of obligations.
The legal academic Kevin Outterson and the medical sociologist Donald Light
argue that pharmaceutical IP constitutes an affirmative barrier placed in the way
of access to health care.86
[T]he patent-based drug companies are not strangers to the global
access to medicines problem; nor are they innocent bystanders
who happen upon a tragedy by chance. They cannot rely on
libertarian arguments to absolve themselves of responsibility.
They helped create the global system of intellectual property law
that stands as a barrier to generic production for the poor... The
patent-based drug companies are among the chief architects and
beneficiaries of this global system, and thus bear enhanced
responsibility for its effects on the poor, even in the absence of
fault or negligence. They are active participants in the creation of
the problem rather than innocent bystanders. The patent-based
drug companies actively work to prevent rescue by others.
Generic production and distribution of patented drugs for low- and
medium-income country populations is possible, as demonstrated
by the actions of generic drug companies such as Cipla Ltd of
India and charities such as Medecins Sans Frontires. But the drug
companies can use patent law to block generic production of the
best available medicines and to drive "unreasonable bargains" on
pricing ...Patent law gives companies the right to block generic
production for poor countries during the patent period, but
exercising it transforms the companies from innocent 87bystanders
into entities claiming the legal right to prevent rescue.
I agree with Outterson and Light that pharmaceutical IP holders who assert
their rights are placing a barrier in the way of access to medicines. But so are
holders of rights to real property or to money. When a pharmaceutical retailer-as
opposed to an IP holder-refuses to let an impoverished parent bring home a
prescription for her child without paying, the retailer is also asserting the "legal
right to prevent rescue." The same is true when the bank next door locks its vaults,
or wealthy customers in the store close their wallets and refuse to pay for needy
patients' medicines. While Outterson and Light assert that "[t]he drug company's
status is ...unique because of the patent law's ability to block the activities of

86. Kevin Outterson & Donald W. Light, Global PharmaceuticalMarkets, in A COMPANION
TO BIOETHICs 417 (Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer eds., 2009).
87. Id. at 418.
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others," 88 this assertion of uniqueness does not survive scrutiny. Property and
contract law prevent rescue just as surely as patent law does. 89 As such, Outterson
and Light's attempt to distance themselves from ethicists who would more
generally "find positive duties on the rich to care for the needy" is unavailing. 90
Thomas Pogge has also argued that pharmaceutical firms are affirmatively
harming the global poor. As Glenn Cohen summarizes,
Pogge begins with the idea that all people have rights to a
"minimally worthwhile life" and therefore require a share of
minimum levels of basic goods, including health care, that are
essential to a decent life - he terms such goods "human rights."
According to Pogge's theory, citizens of one state have an
obligation to avoid "harming" citizens of another state by
imposing "deficits" on their access to these human rights; that is,
he argues that "[w]e are harming the global poor if and insofar as
we collaborate in imposing" a "global institutional order. .. [that]
foreseeably perpetuates large-scale human rights deficits that
would be reasonably avoided through foreseeable institutional
modifications." 91
While Pogge's claim that everyone has a right to a minimally decent life is
plausible and is consistent with human rights documents, 92 his claim that the global
international order is affirmatively harming the poor, rather than failing to provide
them with fair benefits, has been vigorously and persuasively challenged by
Norman Daniels and others who point out that describing the international order

88. Id. at 419.
89. See Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27
(1959) ("All property rights interfere with the ability of people to use resources. What has to be
insured is that the gain from interference more than offsets the harm it produces."); James Sterba,
From Liberty to Welfare, 105 ETHics 65, 70 (1994) (observing that property rights interfere with "the
liberty of the poor not to be interfered with in taking from the surplus possessions of the rich what is
necessary to satisfy their basic needs").
90. Outterson & Light, supra note 86, at 420.
91. I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 43 (2011) (quoting THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002)).
While this Article cites Pogge's work because of its influence on the debate, it also acknowledges
the numerous charges of sexual misconduct against Pogge. See Colleen Flaherty, Separating the
Philosophy from
the
Philosopher, INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.,
Aug.
3, 2016,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/03/philosophers-move-limit-alleged-harassersinfluence-within-discipline (reporting numerous allegations that Pogge has harassed women
students, and discussing efforts to respond, including syllabus and citation boycotts).
92. See Persad, supranote 64, at 603-06 (discussing conceptions of the right to health as a right
to a decent minimum)
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as inflicting harm requires adopting a tendentious definition of harm.9 3 More
importantly, even if we grant its correctness for the sake of argument, Pogge's
view - like Outterson and Light's - is unable to support pharmaceutical
exceptionalism. Firms like Coca-Cola and Gucci also rely on and lobby for
international trade rules, and are embedded in networks of global commerce.
Activists' more provocative suggestion that pharmaceutical IP holders who
enforce their rights actively kill patients in need faces the same problem. 94 Even if
the IP holder could be described as killing the poor by depriving them of
medicines, the same is true of the retailer and the fellow customer. It is more
plausible to say that all three fail to aid the poor than to say that some kill the poor
while others merely fail to help.
Some have instead argued that pharmaceutical IP holders owe special
obligations to the global poor because they benefit from publicly funded research
investments by universities and governments.95 The case for such duties appears
normatively compelling, particularly where universities and governments provide
the fruits of their research below cost or for free, and would differentiate at least
some pharmaceutical IP from many types of non-pharmaceutical IP. 96 However,
this argument does not support the IP-focused policies discussed in Part I.B. Only
pharmaceutical IP holders who benefited from such investments would owe duties.
More importantly, these duties would be owed to universities and developed world
governments, not directly to the global poor: the extent to which these universities
and governments should direct pharmaceutical IP holders to assist the global poor,
93. See Cohen, supra note 91, at 44 (citing NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH 337-40 (2008));
see also Mathias Risse, Do We Owe the GlobalPoorAssistance or Rectification? 19 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 9, 9 (2005) (arguing that the "global order does not harm the poor according to the benchmarks
of comparison used by Pogge"); Debra Satz, What Do We Owe the GlobalPoor?, 19 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 47, 53-54 (2005) (agreeing that the global status quo is unjust, but rejecting Pogge's "specific
argument that the advantaged citizens of the affluent countries actively cause most of the severe
poverty in the world" and suggesting that this argument relies on an "understanding of causation"
that "erodes the distinction between harming and failing to remedy").
94. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights:
Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 36, 89 (2011) (reporting Swedish Pirate Party's
assertion that "Pharmaceutical patents kill people in third world countries every day"); Lisa C.
Pavento et al., International Patent Protection for HIV-Related Therapies: Patent Attorneys'
Perspective, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 919, 920 (2003) (describing editorial alleging that "the U.S.
pharmaceutical companies were, in essence, killing millions of people" through patent enforcement).
95. I am grateful to Ameet Sarpatwari for suggesting that I examine this argument. See Lissett
Ferreira, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational
PharmaceuticalCorporations,71 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1133, 1142 (2002) ("[D]evelopment of new
drugs frequently is subsidized heavily by the taxpayer's money and performed in publicly-funded
laboratories. Thus, critics... argue that it is unfair for drug companies to reap huge profits from the
inflated prices they charge for products developed using taxpayer money."); see also Outterson &
Light, supra note 86, at 423.
96. This argument could be understood as appealing to ideas of unjust enrichment; see Moore,
supra note 69, at 1187.
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rather than to assist the domestic poor or to invest in scientific research, is a
complex question.
A final argument would point to egregious misconduct by pharmaceutical IP
holders, such as false advertising, anticompetitive conduct, and the funding of
misleading clinical trials. Scholars have identified compelling evidence of such
misconduct. 97 But this misconduct likewise does not support the proposals in Part
I.B. Rather, it supports efforts to enforce greater clinical trial transparency, to
regulate advertising, and to ensure competition. A focus on corporate misconduct
would also sweep more broadly than pharmaceutical firms, given the many nonpharmaceutical firms and wealthy private individuals who hamper global health
aims through egregious misconduct like pollution, tax evasion, and the sale of
harmful products.

III. CAN WE MEET GLOBAL HEALTH NEEDS WITHOUT EXCEPTIONALISM?

Part H's conclusion is that assigning special responsibility to pharmaceutical
IP holders is difficult to defend. However, pharmaceutical IP holders retain the
same responsibilities to assist patients in need, like Phumeza, that others who are
equally well-off and equally well placed to aid do. This Part will consider two
strategies for assisting patients like Phumeza that do not focus narrowly on the
elimination or weakening of IP rights. It will then argue that while nonexceptionalist strategies for helping poor patients are the best option, it is
acceptable to employ pharmaceutical exceptionalist policies when doing so is the
most attainable way of achieving important global health goals.
A. FundingAccess to Medicines
Access to medicines can be achieved via routes other than IP, such as "pull"
programs that reward the development of medicines and "'push" programs that
encourage research. 98 A prominent example of a pull program is a prize system,
which would offer a prize to firms or other actors who develop drugs that have
certain desirable outcomes.99 These desirable outcomes can be overall

97. See, e.g., BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: How DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND
HARM PATIENTS (2013); PETER GOTZCHE, DEADLY MEDICINES AND ORGANIZED CRIME: How BIG

PHARMA HAS CORRUPTED HEALTHCARE (2013); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG
COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).

98. See Evan Wisser, Note, SimulatingPharmaceuticalMarkets in the Developing World: The
Problems with "Pull" Funding Mechanisms, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 261, 272-73 (2012).
99. See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 973 (2012); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-PrizesDebate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 317 (2013).
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improvements in health or can be more specific subcategories of improvements
such as new antibiotics. These prizes would incentivize research in these areas, just
as the monopoly granted to patent recipients is supposed to incentivize research.
However, unlike with IP, the prizewinning intervention would then enter the public
domain and be producible by generic manufacturers, enabling its provision at a
lower cost.'00 In fact, as Amy Kapczynski notes, patients like Phumeza may benefit
more from pull programs than from limitations on IP rights. 101 Another type of pull
program is a patent buy-out, in which the patent rights to drugs that poor patients
need would be bought out to enable generic03 production. 10 2 'Push" programs,
meanwhile, include grants that fund research. 1
Unlike IP systems, which incentivize innovation by granting monopolies,
grants, prizes and patent buy-outs all need to be paid for in advance. 104 This makes
them more politically challenging, but also more able to surmount pharmaceutical
exceptionalism because paying for them requires identifying revenue sources.
Push or pull programs could be funded by a variety of actors, including
governments, international organizations, and NGOs. These actors could exhort
wealthy firms like Gucci and Coca-Cola, as well as wealthy private individuals, to
donate. Or, if politically feasible, governments or international organizations could
impose taxes or fees that reach a variety of actors who have the ability to pay. Two
such proposals are a financial transactions tax and a global wealth tax. Thomas
Piketty has recently proposed a global wealth tax as a way of rectifying economic
inequality.' 05 However, such a tax could also be used to promote access to global
health for the global poor. Unlike pharmaceutical-exceptionalist policies, a global
wealth tax would treat pharmaceutical IP identically to other forms of property. It
would align the burdens of the duty to assist with individuals' capacity to assist.
Another possibility would be a financial transactions tax, which imposes a small

100. Kapczynski, supra note 99, at 973 ("[A] government offers a financial reward to anyone
who creates a desired invention--say, a vaccine. The inventor enjoys the benefit of the reward, and
the government puts the information it has purchased in the public domain.").
101. Id. at 998-99 ("It is no accident that the global access to medicines campaign and its focus
on addressing patent barriers to medicines arose out of the HIV/AIDS movement. A large enough
community of people living with HIV in wealthy countries existed to attract investment into new
medicines to treat HIV. No similar interest exists in developing treatments for conditions such as
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB)--the largest impact of which is felt in South Africa. No
patent exception can give patients with this form of TB better access to simple and fast-acting
medicines, because such medicines do not exist.").
102. Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovationsfor Low- andMiddleIncome Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 160-61 (2006).
103. W. Nicholson Price, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019).

104. Wisser, supra note 98, at 273.
105. Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, 113 MICH. L. REv. 833, 850 (2015)
(discussing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL 529 (2014)).
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fee on stock trades and other transactions involving financial instruments. 106 Such
a tax would not track ability to assist perfectly, as it would impose greater burdens
on financial transactors than on wealthy individuals or firms who simply sit on
their assets. However, it would be more equitable than pharmaceuticalexceptionalist approaches.
B. Contribution
A more modest way of moving away from pharmaceutical exceptionalism
would be to continue imposing duties to aid on pharmaceutical IP holders, while
creating a mechanism for them to seek contributions from those who hold other
forms of property. This approach would resemble the right of contribution in the
common law of torts, which permits a tortfeasor who is jointly liable for a harm to
seek contribution from other tortfeasors. As a recent article explains,
Contribution arose as an equitable rule to ameliorate the perceived
unfairness of holding one joint tortfeasor jointly and severally
liable for all of an indivisible harm caused by multiple parties. The
common law of contribution provides such a joint tortfeasor with
a cause of action "to collect from others responsible for the same
tort after the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate
share." A common law contribution plaintiff can recover if she
proves a common liability with defendants and a payment to
resolve that liability in excess of her equitable share. 107
While early common law did not provide for a right to contribution, most
jurisdictions now do. 108 One prominent justification for permitting contribution is
fairness - that it is inequitable to impose the full cost of a harm on only one among
many parties who are jointly responsible for causing it. 109 The Supreme Court has
recognized this fairness principle when discussing contribution.' 10The imposition
of responsibilities on pharmaceutical IP holders is arguably a case of liability for
106. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards A Framework Convention on Global
Health:A TransformativeAgendafor Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICs
1, 60-61 (2013) (suggesting financial transaction tax for funding global health); Kevin A. Klock,
Note, The Soft Law Alternative to the WHO's Treaty Powers, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 821, 846 (2013)
(discussing a "financial transaction tax.., meant to generate funds to support 'health and health
R&D relevant to developing countries'); David Gartner, Innovative Financing and Sustainable
Development: Lessons from GlobalHealth, 24 WASH. INT'L L.J. 495, 508 (2015).
107. Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law of Liable Party CERCLA Claims, 70
STAN. L. REv. 191, 239-40 (2018).
108. John H. Langmore & Robert H. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities
Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such A Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1020-21 (1991).
109. Id.at 1059-63.
110. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974).

EXAMINING PHARMACEUTICAL EXCEPTIONALISM

nonfeasance, rather than liability for misfeasance. Dividing liability for
nonfeasance among multiple nonfeasant parties, however, is a recognized
challenge. 1 1' Essentially, if holders of IP are responsible for the health deficits the
global poor face, as the authors discussed in Part I argue, they should be permitted
to seek contribution from others who are also failing to contribute to the realization
of the right to health. 112
The contribution-based approach could be implemented by allowing
pharmaceutical IP holders to obtain contributions from others who share joint
responsibility for global health deficits. This contribution could take the form of
monetary transfers and could be obtained via traditional legal channels. Another
way of implementing this contribution-based approach would be to permit
pharmaceutical IP holders whose rights are abrogated to in turn abrogate the IP of
other similarly situated actors. So, for instance, if both Gucci and a pharmaceutical
IP holder have a duty to alleviate the problems of the global poor, but only the
latter is facing the imposition of legal duties to aid, the pharmaceutical IP holder
would in turn have a (potentially transferable) right to use Gucci's IP. Even if this
sort of IP cascade is inefficient, it could serve as a penalty default that motivates a
move toward a prize system or some other way of improving health care
access for
11 3
the global poor that distributes the burden of doing so more equitably.
I use Gucci, of course, only as an example, and not to suggest that Gucci is
uniquely deficient in its contribution to global health. A detailed analysis of how
responsibility for global health deficits should be apportioned is beyond this
Article's scope. However, the two most relevant factors in assigning responsibility
to help are an actor's (a) affirmative contribution to deficits, and (b) its capacity to
remedy deficits. Actors who affirmatively contribute to global health deficits might
include, for instance, polluting industries and marketers of unhealthy foods or
tobacco. Actors with the capacity to remedy deficits, meanwhile, will be those with
substantial resources--whether fungible, like money, or non-fungible, like food or
medicines. Gucci's substantial capacity to remedy deficits can justify imposing
more substantial duties on it than on, for instance, a local fast food restaurant or
trucking business, even if the latter two businesses make more obvious
contributions to health deficits.

111. Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272,
1288 (1949) ("Suppose A is in danger and fifty men are at hand to rescue him. Must all attempt the
rescue under pain of liability?").
112. Cf Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO.
L.J. 605, 623 (2001) ("If all fifty fail to rescue the one, then.., they are all liable (though in this case
we would add that the plaintiff can recover only once and that the enforced-against tortfeasor may
seek contribution from the others).").
113. Cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1989).
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C. An Expediency-Based Casefor PharmaceuticalExceptionalism
If neither broad-based funding for push and pull programs nor contribution
prove politically feasible, we face the question of whether pharmaceutical
exceptionalism is an acceptable, even if nonideal, policy approach. This Subpart
will argue that pharmaceutical exceptionalist policies can be acceptable, but should
be recognized as creatures of practical expediency rather than as fundamentally
required by justice.
Why might pharmaceutical exceptionalism be more politically attractive than
broad-based funding for access to medicines? One reason is that the legal incidence
of exceptionalist policies falls on a small and unpopular set of actors
(pharmaceutical IP holders), rather than middle-class taxpayers. 1 14 Another is that
pharmaceutical exceptionalist policies provide in-kind benefits to poor patients
that can neither be misspent nor redirected to other social priorities. 5 These
factors make pharmaceutical exceptionalism analogous to other policy choices,
such as the preference for regulatory mandates rather than taxes, that are criticized
as inefficient by scholars and "policy wonks" but frequently implemented in
practice.116 One analogue for pharmaceutical exceptionalism is the effort to
improve housing affordability via inclusionary zoning requirements imposed on
developers, rather than via taxpayer-subsidized housing vouchers. Commentators
have criticized inclusionary zoning for treating developers unfairly and for creating
perverse incentives:
If people knew that landowners had to bear the cost of providing
affordable housing, the policy might be considered unfair or even
a taking because landowners have no more responsibility to pay
the full cost of social policies than anyone else. If people knew
that market-rate home buyers had to bear the cost of providing
affordable housing, the policy also might be considered
counterproductive because rather than creating more affordable
114. Cf Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The PoliticalPsychology of Redistribution,
52 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1761, 1782 (2005) (hypothesizing and confirming that people prefer

"hidden" taxes that initially fall on a third party (e.g. corporate taxes) to taxes that initially fall on
individuals).
115. Cf Johanna Brenner, Towards A Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J.L. &

99, 105 (1989) ("While popular attitudes toward welfare are generally negative, voters
tend to prefer in-kind benefits to cash handouts.").
116. Cf Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policyfor an Economic Downturn: A
FEMINISM

Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 27 (2010) ("Given...
infrastructural and political realities, there is no mystery why command and control strategies
succeed politically while Pigouvian taxes fail. The costs of regulations are not explicitly tied to the
regulatory mandate, but instead are quietly passed on by manufacturers in the form of higher prices
or lower wages and investment returns[.]").
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housing, the policy would be making the majority of homes more
expensive. "'
18
Despite these criticisms, inclusionary zoning is popular and widely used. 1
Its popularity likely reflects the fact that it can be implemented without imposing
visible burdens on taxpayers. 119
Assuming that pharmaceutical exceptionalism is politically tenable, three
concepts are useful in assessing its desirability: vertical equity, horizontal equity,
and efficiency. Vertical equity is achieved by appropriately responding to different
actors' economic circumstances, and is often associated with policies that impose
lesser burdens on the disadvantaged. 120 Horizontal equity is achieved by treating
like actors alike. 121Efficiency is achieved by enlarging the total sum of societal
also
resources. 122 While these concepts are most familiar in tax policy, they have
23

1
been used to analyze, inter alia, real estate regulation and health policy.

Pharmaceutical exceptionalist policies typically advance vertical equity,
because they transfer entitlements from wealthier pharmaceutical firms to the
global poor. However, as Part II argued, they violate horizontal equity, because
117. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, "The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed": How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 483 (2005); see also
Jai Keep-Barnes, Inclusionary Zoning as a Taking: A Critical Look at Its Ability to Provide
Affordable Housing, 49 URB.LAW. 67, 100 (2017) (similar); Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of
"Inclusionary"Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167, 1184-85 (1981).
118. Keaton Norquist, Local Preferences in Affordable Housing: Special Treatmentfor Those
Who Live or Work in A Municipality?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REV. 207, 208 (2009) (stating that
"[o]ne of the most popular and effective solutions" to lack of affordable housing "has been the
enactment of inclusionary zoning ordinances requiring residential developers to set aside a specified
percentage of new units - often ten to fifteen percent - which must be sold or rented at prices
deemed affordable to low- and moderate-income households"); Cecily T. Talbert et. al., Recent
Developments in InclusionaryZoning, 38 URB. LAW. 701, 706 (2006) (similar).
119. See Paul Boudreaux, Infill: New Housingfor Twenty-First-CenturyAmerica, 45 FORDHAM
URiB. L.J. 595, 632 (2018) (observing that inclusionary zoning is "perhaps the most popular
mechanism to ensure the creation of permanent new low-cost housing," and that its popularity may
reflect its implementability without "financial expenditures by the government, in contrast to
techniques such as subsidies, tax breaks, and duties to provide fair shares" because "[t]he expenses
of providing low-cost housing are borne by housing developers.").
120. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the ProgressivityDebate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919,
933 (1997) ("[Vlertical equity entails appropriately differentiating among individuals in dissimilar
economic circumstances."); Vemellia R. Randall, RacistHealth Care:Reforming an Unjust Health
Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 165 (1993) ("Vertical
equity suggests that a good policy proposal is one that favors the have-nots over the haves in the
distribution of benefits.").
121. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 415 (1977) ("Horizontal equity requires government to treat like persons alike.").
122. Randall, supra note 120, at 165.
123. See Ellickson, supranote 121; Randall, supra note 120.
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there is no compelling basis for treating pharmaceutical IP holders as more
responsible for the plight of poor patients than other firms or wealthy individuals
are. Pharmaceutical exceptionalism's effects on efficiency, meanwhile, are
unclear: although exceptionalist policies create perverse incentives to avoid
current intellectual property law contains
investment in pharmaceutical research,
24
its own suboptimal incentives. 1
When vertical and horizontal equity conflict, it can be acceptable to violate
horizontal equity in order to achieve vertical equity. 125 To the extent that it can
genuinely improve vertical equity, pharmaceutical exceptionalism represents this
sort of allowable violation. In taking this position, this Article parts company with
recent commentators who worry about unfairness to pharmaceutical firms. For
example, Rebecca Wolitz has worried that
Without additional argument, it seems unfair to single out
biopharmaceutical companies to sacrifice their profits or products
to rescue others. Why not say that other groups... have an
obligation of rescue to pitch in and pony up? Why effectively
impose a moral tax on a particular
industry merely qua that
126
industry being that industry?
Other commentators assert that society should not require pharmaceutical
companies to help the poor unless everyone with comparable ability to pay is also
required to do so.1 27 These objections go wrong by allowing the perfect to be the
124. See Rachel Sachs, The Uneasy Casefor PatentLaw, 117 MICH. L. REV. 499, 544-45 (2018)
(observing that innovation in microbiome technology has proceeded without the need for patent
protection); Hannah Brennan et. al., A Prescriptionfor Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 275, 295 (2016) (contending that the
patent system's conferral of monopoly power on patent-holders produces avoidable "deadweight
loss"); Peter K. Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 898 (2007) (arguing
that "there is insufficient empirical evidence to warrant the recent expansion of intellectual property
rights").
125. Cf LLAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 17072 (2002); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should
Incorporate Equity As Well As Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2501 (2014) ("Arguing for the
unimportance of horizontal equity is the idea that the government should take the opportunity to
distribute an entitlement to the poor at a low efficiency cost because the poor need the money ...
[C]riticizing aiding some of the poor but not others amounts to holding the desperately needed aid
for the poor hostage to the desire to help all of the poor.").
126. Wolitz, supra note 76, at 1204.
127. Anita Ho, Global Health Disparity andPharmaceuticalCompanies' Obligation to Assist,
in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICS 29, 36 (Dien Ho ed., 2017) (suggesting that "holding

only pharmaceutical companies responsible without calling upon other industries to assist under the
duty of rescue is going too far and unfair to drug companies"); Pepe Lee Chang, Who's in the
Business of Saving Lives?, 31 J. MED. & PHIL. 465,476 (2006) ("If we do not require other types of
corporations to save lives then we should not require drug companies to do so.").
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enemy of the good. Just as "[t]here would be nothing unfair... in a tax on
chocolate ice cream but not on vanilla, though it would be arbitrary," 128 there
similarly is nothing fundamentally unfair about taxing pharmaceutical IP holders
while not taxing others who have equal ability to pay. (Although - as Part II
argues - there is also nothing fundamentally just about taxing pharmaceutical IP
holders either.) Courts are rightly reluctant to find that violations of horizontal
equity constitute violations of the right to equal protection. 129 Instead, courts
typically find that governments are permitted to tax and regulate in overinclusive
or underinclusive ways, so long as there is a rational relationship between the
objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. 30 Even though
pharmaceutical exceptionalism is often suboptimal from both fairness and
efficiency perspectives, it can be justified where fairer or more efficient policy
options are politically or practically impossible.
CONCLUSION

I have reviewed the arguments for and against pharmaceutical exceptionalism
and found much to doubt in both. Ultimately, this Article disagrees with
pharmaceutical exceptionalism's most vehement advocates, but also with its most
vehement critics. Pharmaceutical IP holders - like developers subjected to
inclusionary zoning requirements - have no special moral obligation to assist the
disadvantaged: their duties are the same as those of anyone else who can help,
including firms like Gucci and Coca-Cola. But - as with developers - even
though pharmaceutical IP holders have no special moral obligation to help, it can
be acceptable to task them with a special legal obligation to do so. The imposition
of such a legal obligation is analogous to the creation of other civil obligations that
track no antecedent moral rule.'31
Whether it is wise to require pharmaceutical IP holders to assist poor patients
depends on what the available alternatives are, and what the consequences of
128. MURPHY &NAGEL, supra note 125, at 170.
129. Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Restrictingthe Legislative Power to Tax in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 656 (2006) ("The Court's reluctance to second guess a legislature's
decision has led it to establish a high threshold in order to find a tax provision unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds."); John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property:
Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 421, 436 (2000) ("[T]ax laws
can be highly discriminatory (horizontally inequitable) and still pass Equal Protection muster.").
130. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("[R]eform may take one step
at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind... The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the
others." (citing Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) and
Am.Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949)).
131. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 68 (2d ed. 1994) ("There can be legal rights
and duties which have no moral justification or force whatever.").
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imposing such an obligation would be. While the arbitrary treatment of
pharmaceutical IP holders is not a sufficient reason to reject pharmaceutical
exceptionalism, decreases in long-term innovation and ensuing losses for future
patients would be. The risk of such an outcome can only be determined by
empirical analysis.
This Article's conclusion, then, is that pharmaceutical exceptionalism should
neither be reviled nor exalted, but instead should be recognized as resting on
pragmatic and contingent, rather than principled, foundations. It is, fundamentally,
a kludge. 132 As with any other kludge, we should recognize and examine the shortterm risks of eliminating it, but also investigate whether some more elegant
alternative will serve us better in the long run.

132. See D. Casey Flaherty, Copy, Paste,Repeat ...No More, ACC Ass'N OF CORP. COUNS.
DOCKET, Sept. 2014, at 128, 128 ("A kludge is a crude workaround, an assortment of poorly matching

parts that form a sub-optimal but serviceable whole. A kludge is often the outcome of jury-rigging
-- in the nautical, rather than the courtroom, sense - a semi-functional contrivance made from
materials that happen to be on hand."); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Is "MedicalMar'uana'"an Idea Whose
Time has Come - and Gone?, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 173, 175 (2014) ("Allowing for medical use
of an otherwise-banned drug that has not passed through the usual drug-approval process is no doubt
a regulatory kludge, but it is arguably the "least-bad" of the politically and operationally available
options.").

